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“Identity-Based” and “Diversity-Based” Evidence Between Linear and Fractal 
Rationality 
 
by Maurizio Manzin 
University of Trento, CERMEG 
 
Abstract 
Every individual when making an opinion always sees from a here-and-now point of view characterized 
by an overlapping of beliefs (produced by inner activities dealing with reasonings, feelings and ethical 
standards). In the history of philosophy we can find two main types of evidence, based on what we might 
call “linear” and “fractal” rationality.  In the light of the former, which almost exclusively fosters formal 
deductivism, evidence is based on mere systematic coherence, and all other sources of knowledge (intuitive, 
perceptive, symbolic, poetic, moral etc.) are marginalized – persuasion included. In the light of “fractal” 
rationality, which is more adherent to the ‘irregularities’ of life, evidence requires instead a meta-analytical 
approach, and persuasion is appreciated as a (not irrational) way to settle disagreements. I argue that these 
two different types of evidence and evaluation of persuasion are related, in the first case, to Neoplatonism 
and Cartesianism with their overestimation of identity, and in the second one to Plato’s account on the 
coessentiality of identity and diversity. The analysis of the two approaches could contribute to a better 
understanding of the relations between diversity, persuasion and evidence, also in order to manage conflicts 
of opinions. 
 
    1. Starting with an anthropology rather than a theory  
What do we talk about when we talk about argumentation? It would be easy to start a 
discussion on evidence and persuasion by taking into account some grand récit (to quote 
J.-F. Lyotard)1 on the role of reasoning and speech in finding an agreement about the 
evidence of an object of proof, both privately and publicly. But this is exactly what we 
should not do when talking about evidence and persuasion in contexts characterized by 
inevitable diversities. I mean, the risk is to look at the state of the art always from a 
dominantly theoretical point of view, when the previous choices regarding the reference 
theory have already been made. These choices imply in fact an argumentative 
commitment which should in turn be justified, pushing us into the closed alley of a 
regressio ad infinitum. For this reason it would instead be more profitable to take into 
consideration the anthropological conditions in which individuals act and theorize.  
 
1 Lyotard 1984 
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When we consider whatsoever issue, we always consider it from a here-and-now 
concrete situation characterized by an overlapping of individuals’ beliefs, which are 
produced by inner activities expressed by reasonings, feelings and ethical standards. 
Thus, when we maintain that the relation between evidence and persuasion depends on 
the underlying theory of knowledge, we should clarify what kind of anthropology we are 
dealing with, with regard to space, time and conditions.  
Something could be assumed as ‘evident’ (i) either as a proposition which is valid 
according to a certain account on logic – typically, as a coherent deduction from some 
premises; or (ii) as a fact ascertained by empirical tools (from the Latin evidens = ex + 
videre, knowing by seeing) – as occurs with the s. c. scientific evidence. Both (i) and (ii) 
are current interpretations dating back to the origins of the modern age, and both fit very 
well with a rationalist anthropology. But in the light of a different anthropology – as the 
one common to Plato and Aristotle – evidence could also be provided (iii) by some speech 
procedures connected to pistis (and not only to episteme), as it is the case with dialectic, 
whose premises are neither axioms nor experimental standards (“protocols”) but widely 
influential arguments well known to all experts in the matter (endoxa).  
In cases (i), (ii) and (iii) persuasion is not necessary or at most it is a character intrinsic 
to truth itself (I will explain this point better shortly). Persuasion becomes necessary when 
such means (analytical demonstrations, experimental tests, dialectical – “critical” – 
discussions) cannot work. This happens when no stipulative conditions are available or 
when agreement on premises lacks for various reasons. In those moments the floor is 
open to the “likely” (eikos) – in Aristotle’s words, “what can be otherwise than it is” – 
and the appeal to effective (i.e. persuasive) grounds for evidence is strictly required.  
What changes in this case, in comparison to the previous (i) (ii) and (iii) cases, is the 
presence of a concrete (and therefore possibly unskilled or slightly interactive) audience: 
an audience who does not share stipulations, empirical knowledge or experts’ 
commonplaces. This is a typically rhetorical situation – case (iv) –, which was familiar 
to a non-individualist and non-rationalist anthropology like the one of the Greek polis 
with its agora. 
 
2. A reasoning for the irregularity of life 
In a recent article C. Tindale alludes to “linear rationality” as something which 
“isolates actions into points in a sequence and fails to treat them as issuing from lives in 
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which values and beliefs are integrated in complex webs” (Tindale 2019: 15)2. In other 
words, a kind of rationality claiming for neutrality and impartiality (i.e. absence of 
valuable choices), contradictorily taken as a valuable choice. This has always been the 
line of modernity which broke out with Cartesianism, although it was already well known 
by Plato and Aristotle.  
Of the two, especially the first criticized such choice-not-to-choose, if intended as the 
only authentic form of knowledge. In his dialogue with Meno, for instance, the Athenian 
makes possible for a young slave to demonstrate (a version of) the Pythagorean theorem, 
giving him only some simple axioms and a minimum of method. Plato’s intention was to 
show how geometry, which does not seem to imply discussion on values, is an elementary 
(though useful, of course) way of knowledge, and how dialectic is conversely an higher 
way, capable of sustaining epistemic demonstrations like the Pythagorean even with 
unlearned people. Interestingly, in his Republic Plato (according to Heidegger 1998) deals 
with two meanings of truth: as orthotes (linearity) and as aletheia (revelation),3 implying 
this way that besides deductive coherence also other means can provide evidence.  
We can therefore assume that in classical theories analytical demonstrations 
(apodeixis), which are described as linear (orthos), do not exclude or marginalize other 
kinds of reasoning which are not linear. The nonlinear reasonings – as it has been 
specified by Aristotle in some of his works4 – are the ones coming from pistis (trust), like 
dialectic and rhetoric (Piazza 2011). Trust then depends on the concrete Lebensform 
(Wittgenstein 1958, Boncompagni 2011) in which a discussion takes place. According to 
C. Tindale nonlinear rationality springs from “a system of managed diversity” (as he 
defines the “form of life”)5. We could say that nonlinear rationality fits with situations in 
which stipulations and expert knowledge are not on hand, whereas linear rationality 
works only with abstract objects in abstract contexts. 
My intention would be to use a term (and a concept) antagonistic to that of Tindale, to 
designate an intellectual activity capable of catching the roughness of Lebensformen with 
all their possible diversities and disagreements. The term I would like to propose here is 
“fractal rationality”.  
 
2 To be published in the proceedings of ECA Groningen 2019 Conference. Quotations are from the Author’s 
text provided on the occasion of the conference. 
3 A distinction someway stressed also by St. Augustin, when talking about veritas connexionum and veritas 
sententiarum in Book II, §34 of his De doctrina christiana (Augustine 1995). 
4 I owe much of my knowledge about Aristotelian logic and practical philosophy to the influential studies 
of Enrico Berti. For a first overview on them (in English) see Natali 2011. 
5 Tindale 2019: 16. 
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According to the Encyclopaedia Britannica6,  
 
Fractal, in mathematics, [is] any of a class of complex geometric shapes that commonly have 
“fractional dimension,” a concept first introduced by the mathematician Felix Hausdorff in 1918. 
Fractals are distinct from the simple figures of classical, or Euclidean, geometry – the square, the 
circle, the sphere, and so forth. They are capable of describing many irregularly shaped objects 
or spatially nonuniform phenomena in nature such as coastlines and mountain ranges. The term 
fractal, derived from the Latin word fractus (“fragmented,” or “broken”), was coined by the 
Polish-born mathematician Benoit B. Mandelbrot etc. 
 
This divide between an Euclidean perspective that conceives only regular shapes, and 
a fractal one that manages all irregularly shaped objects7, is precisely the turning point of 
my argument on rationality and its connection with evidence and persuasion, as I am 
trying to clear up in the following section.  
 
3. The privilege of regularity: a short history 
Once distinguished and named these two species of rationality (linear and fractal) – or 
to say better these two different attitudes towards reasoning – I would like to refer to some 
previous studies of mine focused on the origin of “systematic thought” in Western legal 
philosophy8, because the exclusive preference for linear rationality (episteme) and the 
subsidiary contempt for reasoning based on trust (pistis) are deeply rooted in the history 
of Western thought. This section of my paper will therefore provide a (necessarily) brief 
overview on how the privilege of linearity broke off the fractal tradition of dialectic and 
rhetoric that dated back to the ancient paideia.  
The privilege of “systematic thought” is a consequence of the success gained by the 
later developments of Platonism (s.c. Neoplatonism), due to the reception of Plotinus’ 
theories (203/205 - 270 AD) and to the drafting of The Enneads made by his favorite 
pupil Porphirius (233/4 - ?305 AD)9.  According to the philosophical accounts which 
were worked out by the many scholars who followed Neoplatonic teachings, identity and 
unity should be considered the golden standard for knowledge. All visible and invisible 
things, which seem prima facie to be different and many, should be regarded as parts of 
a whole that, in its being, forms an absolute and perfect “One”. The search for identity 
 
6 https://www.britannica.com/science/fractal 
7 On “non-Euclidean” reasonings in legal argumentation see Manzin 2018. 
8 Manzin 2008. 
9 In my book I point out to what extent and fidelity Porphirius did so. 
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and unity – maybe a counterpart of the real historical situation, characterized by the 
fracture of Roman political and civil institutions and by a growing sense of incertitude – 
became this way the supreme ideal of a great number of philosophers.  
In the fifth century AD, when joining the Neoplatonic Academy of Athens, Proclus 
(412 - 485 AD) picked up the inheritance of the diadochoi (“successors” – as the 
Neoplatonists called themselves) and developed it in his most influential work: Elements 
of Theology, where the One (en) stays at the top of a universal hierarchical triadic system 
that incorporates, under the pure essence of God (identity of the One to itself), all the 
other ranks of being (“elements”), either visible or invisible. In “systematic thought” each 
element is linked to the other according to a continuous ascending or descending line, 
leaving no room to interruptions or fractality – an expression of a sort of horror vacui. 
After the closing of the Academy of Athens (529 AD) ruled by Christian emperor 
Justinian the Great, the privilege of linearity and identity did not cease – it was simply 
translated into orthodox Christian terms, thanks to the work of a mysterious writer who 
named himself Dionysius the Aeropagite, pseudonym of a Syrian author of the fifth or 
maybe sixth century AD. The Corpus Dionysianum (or Corpus Aeropagiticum) spread 
widely through the byzantine empire, but was ‘discovered’ in Western Europe only after 
its translation into Latin by John Scotus Eriugena in the eight century AD. Thanks to 
Scotus’ translation (and much later also to the Liber de causis) Dionysian paradigm of 
hierarchical order gradually became a normative one in philosophy, theology and law, as 
can easily be ascertained looking at the Scholastic tradition  – once again, maybe as a 
counterpart of the real historical situation, dominated by the struggle between 
ecclesiastical and political powers. 
Such obsession for linearity and order in a world of diversities and conflicts is 
symptomatic, and let us suppose that whenever an era is felt as one of dramatic change 
and discontinuity, people (it does not matter if learned or not) are compelled to prefer a 
thought capable of reassuring against the unpredictability of events.  
This is the case of Descartes (1596 - 1650), who maintains that the rising of doubts 
(discontinuity) must conduct to an analytical decomposition of complex elements into 
simpler ones, and to a successive recomposition into a deductive linear chain (continuity). 
Descartes’ grand récit pushed dialectic and rhetoric (i.e. fractal rationality) out of  the 
stage of ‘authentic’ knowledge, relegating them to the field of mere literature. After 
Descartes and until quite recent times, notwithstanding the fierce opposition of some 
isolated authors (the Neapolitan G.B. Vico first and above all), Cartesian narrative and 
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the paradigm of linear rationality dominated the epistemological landscape of Western 
thought for centuries, creating the gap between the “two cultures” (Snow 1959, 1963) – 
in my terms, the linear (“Science” with capital initial) and the fractal (the humanities). 
 
4. Identity vs difference (and a third way) 
It could now be of some interest to know that the authors in favor of what I have called 
fractal rationality – starting with Plato himself – did not oppose difference and 
multiplicity to identity and unity. This point is delicate and deserves further deepening.  
It is notorious that Plato put logic based on pistis (and especially dialectic) alongside 
science based on episteme, depending on the premises provided for the discussion. This 
option for complementarity, which avoids an absolute divide between linear rationality 
and other kinds of speech activities, is rooted in Plato’s account against dualism, as 
reported in his Sophist.  In this dialogue the Athenian criticizes his juvenile preference 
for a strict separation between being and not being, inherited from Parmenides’ traditional 
doctrine. By saying that “in a certain sense not-being is, and being, on the other hand, is 
not”10 Plato establishes the coessentiality of identity and difference as a basis for his 
metaphysics, a basis that turns to be the very antidote to every form of radical dualism 
(as Gnosticism, for instance), and specifically to the separation between episteme (based 
on deduction from ‘self-evident’ premises) and pistis (based on confrontation between 
opinions)11.  
To give a fairly trivial example, saying that A is not B (difference) helps to determine 
that A is A (identity or sameness). In other words, after Plato’s “parricide”, not being pros 
eteron (compared to the other) will no longer be a matter of absolute opposition among 
A and B, C etc. but rather a matter of confrontation finalized to the best determination of 
what A really is. With the appreciable consequence that, instead of building walls 
between identities, we can face all possible opinions about A without fear of negation, 
saving this way the  value of relation. 
The Platonic crucial idea of the coessentiality of identity and difference can also be 
understood in the light of the contradictory account of the ‘two principles’ (archai), 
typical of every dualism, according to which there are two opposite principles: the one of 
being and the one of not being, both to be intended as separate and incomparable among 
each other. The contradiction lays in the evidence that, if each of them is principle of 
 
10 See Plato, Soph. 241 d. Transl. by B. Jowett (http://classics.mit.edu/Plato/sophist.html). 
11 According to this kind of dualism, knowledge based on episteme is always true, while the one coming 
from opinions is always false. In this sense, whatsoever act of persuasion is irredeemably deceptive. 
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something, none is actually the principle: there would in fact be a principle by virtue of 
which A is A (being), and another principle by virtue of which A is not A (not being), 
whereas a principle is a principle if by virtue of it all things – and not only some – are. 
Then to be the principle it must take into one either identity (of A to A) or difference (of 
A from ¬A)12. And that’s the reason why Plato rejects the supremacy of identity without 
however rejecting identity itself.  
An idea which will be broadly – and under many aspect better – developed by his pupil 
Aristotle, who will assign a very particular role to the principle of non-contradiction and 
put dialectic and rhetoric (both coming from pistis) alongside analytics (coming from 
episteme) as means capable of managing the difference of opinions in dialogical situations 
and public discourse.  
What is relevant for me at this point of my discussion is to stress the existence of two 
different accounts on rationality – the linear and the fractal – which have remote origins 
in the history of philosophy. The linear is based upon the overestimation of mere identity 
(A=A),  while the fractal is based upon the appreciation of the coessentiality of identity 
and difference (A=A and A≠¬A). To be shorter, I will hereinafter refer to the latter as the 
one of “diversity”. 
 
5. Identity-based and diversity-based evidence, and the role of persuasion 
The approach based on diversity and the one based on identity coexisted in Western 
thought for centuries, although with fluctuating luck. The first one – the fractal –, which 
as outlined above was consciously or unconsciously rooted in a classic trend deriving 
from Plato and Aristotle, declined with modernity and survived only in a literary guise. 
The second instead – the linear –, which is well represented by Cartesianism, ended up 
occupying the whole scene of ‘authentic’ knowledge, rapidly assisted by the power of 
technique (that it made possible).  
If we accept this account on a divided rationality we should then also distinguish 
between “identity-based” and “diversity-based” evidence, as I mentioned in Section 1. 
The first kind of evidence has a concrete nature, the second a more abstract one – 
abstract in the sense that the object of proof has to be ‘extracted’ from the living situation 
of here-and-now, characterized by “a variety of forms of life that overlap and crisscross 
in a variety of ways” (Tindale 2019: 13), and shifted in a mental order where every shape 
 
12 Such idea of coessentiality is well represented by the symbol of Tao, in which the white and the black 
areas are not rigorously separated, but a part of the one is inside the other. 
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is conceived as regular (to recall one of the founders of modern scientific thought, the 
Italian G. Galilei, an order in which we assume that “the great book of nature is written 
with triangles, circles and other geometrical figures”).  
“Identity-based” evidence, which is grounded on mere formal consistency of the 
conclusions with respect to the premises, could hardly be intended – within a classical 
perspective – as something which implies persuasion in the proper sense of the word. 
According to Plato and Aristotle it is possible to speak of persuasion only in relation with 
truth13 (it is notorious that they fought against Sophists’ relativism and their inappropriate 
use of speech techniques aimed at convincing people about every sort of opinion). For 
them, persuasion without truth is simply a deception – a “pseudo-persuasion”14 (Plato and 
Aristotle, for instance, complain the eristic use of syllogisms – eristike techne – by which 
an argument is presented as logic only to hide its propagandistic purpose)15.  
As underlined by A. Zadro (1983), to understand the relation between persuasion and 
truth we should first take into account the two forms of Greek genitive – the subjective 
and the objective. In the case of subjective genitive, persuasion of truth means: the 
persuasion that spreads from truth itself, as it happens with mathematical demonstrations. 
In this case evidence is a character of the premises (it comes before) that is “preserved” 
in the conclusions, if they are coherently deducted. This kind of persuasion can work only 
with expert people, for whom premises are clear by themselves (‘self-evident’). In the 
case of objective genitive, persuasion of truth means properly: persuasion to truth, in the 
sense that evidence is the outcome  of an argumentative process (it comes after) and – 
consequently – the floor is open to the means of persuasion suitable for different types of 
audience (psycagogia).  
This is exactly the purpose of rhetoric and implies that evidence on things can be 
achieved “in many ways” (pollachos legetai)16, and not exclusively through the 
demonstrations operated within experts. In other words, if “evidence” comes from the 
Latin videre (seeing), an object of proof can be seen differently with different eyes, as it 
occurs when more people discuss about something in concrete situations, particularly in 
public contexts. There  may be some people who see above all with the eyes of the heart 
(pathos), others who are sensitive to the moral attitude of the speaker (ethos), and others 
 
13 On that recently also Rocci 2017. 
14 Zadro 1983. 
15 See Plato, Taeth. 165 d;  Aristotle, Soph. Ref. 33, 183 b. 
 
16 Arist., Phys. 1, 2, 185 a; Met. 4, 1003 a. 
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who look more at the logical frame (logos). Thus persuasion has to be differently 
declined. 
It is precisely the concreteness of the situations that brings into play the variety of 
means by which an object of proof can be assumed, given that every stimulus coming 
from outside is processed by individuals according to logic, feelings and moral values 
interacting with each other (no need to take here out some recent neuroscientific 
discoveries about the s.c. “system 1” and “system 2”)17. With extreme care for the 
diversity of psychai,  the pioneers of the fractal account deepened the role of ethos, pathos 
and logos in building arguments, providing a set of  intuitive, perceptive, symbolic, poetic 
and moral tools. Their guiding idea was that reasoning consists of a continuous adaptation 
to concrete situations and that nothing is more reasonable than the inevitable clashes 
among different opinions, especially when deciding about what to do. They maintained 
in fact that if reasoning needs to ascertain what counts as evident under the contextual 
aspect, it is not in order to ‘neutrally’ establish how things go on, but to move from a 
certain state of affairs to another. This means that, according to the fractal diversity-based 
account, knowing and making (quiet and motion, in Platonic terms) mutually implicate, 
and that an agreement on something as evident – provided by persuasion –  is usually 
oriented by some need to act, regardless of modern Hume’s guillotine. 
For the supporters of fractal rationality, evidence is often problematic and requires 
recourse to what is defined today a “meta-analytical” approach. It is problematic because 
disagreements are physiological and not pathological (as they are considered in a linear 
mentality). Since the time of Heraclitus, eris (disagreement) has been interpreted as the 
arche (principle, origin) of dike (justice)18, that means: difference of opinions is the 
reason on the basis of which people discuss about what would be right or not to do. No 
disagreement means no search for truth, no reasonable interactions between individuals 
or groups of individuals, no need for persuasion, in the end no polis.  
We might wonder at this point what room would be left for persuasion, if not the only 
one guaranteed by the subjective genitive – the ‘necessity’ to admit as evident what 
spreads from truth itself in the eyes of undisputed experts. 
No need to say how undesirable would be to live in a ‘Perfect City’ where all doubts 
were resolved by ‘linear’ experts like these. 
 
 
17 Kahneman 2011, Damasio 1994. 
 
18 Heracl., fragm. 22 b 80 DK. 
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